 that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;
 the existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union;
 the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. 4 
End Extract
In its 2005 opinion, the European Commission judged that Macedonia had "stable democratic institutions which function properly, respecting the limits of their competences and co-operating with each other," although the Commission noted that "the local elections in 2005 displayed a series of serious irregularities." The Commission further assessed that " [t] he rule of law is being gradually consolidated. Considerable efforts at reforming the police have been made since the crisis in 2001. However, steps remain to be taken to secure the rule of law all over the territory. This includes pursuing the reform of the police." But even at that time, the Commission pointed to "institutional weaknesses" in the economy, "shortcomings in the judiciary," and deficiencies in the labor and financial market, which were blamed for impeding "the reduction of particularly high unemployment." 5 Given Macedonia's aspiration to join the EU, its relative success in its post-Yugoslav path must be judged against the foregoing Copenhagen Criteria.
Political Transformation I: 1989-2014
Macedonia's post-socialist political transformation began in 1989, when the country's socialist constitution was amended to permit multiparty elections. These were duly held Work on a new constitution began as early as May 1991, even before the breakup of socialist Yugoslavia. Perhaps the most important controversy connected with the drafting of the constitution had to do with whether to characterize Macedonia as a "citizens' state," meaning that all citizens would enjoy equal rights, or as a "national state," which would privilege the Macedonians over other nationality groups living in the country. With Macedonians constituting a majority of 64.6 per cent but Albanians comprising a sizeable minority with 21.0 per cent of the population (according to the amendments guaranteeing respect for existing borders; an explicit declaration that Macedonia harbored no territorial pretensions against its neighbors; and a promise not to interfere in Greece's internal affairs." 9 The Macedonian Assembly duly approved these measures in January 1992, but with Greece still insisting that it held the copyright to the name "Macedonia," West European recognition was delayed until December 1993, the Republic of Macedonia having been admitted to the United Nations on 8 April 1993 under the name "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia." The Greeks had imposed an economic embargo on landlocked Macedonia the previous year, resulting in shortages of food, oil, and medicine, but lifted the embargo in 1993, as bilateral talks between the two countries got underway. However, in October 1993, Andreas Papandreou, a former professor of economics at the University of California, Berkeley, among other universities, returned to the prime minister's office, after a gap of four years, and terminated the talks with Macedonia. Later, after the United States announced that it would recognize the Republic of Macedonia, 10 the Greek government reimposed its trade embargo, only this time making it even tougher than before. Greece has also continued to block Macedonian efforts to gain admittance into the European Union (EU) and NATO; this has had consequences for the country's politics, inducing an assertive nationalist reaction manifested, inter alia, in a dramatic makeover of Skopje, including the erection of a 40-ton, 11-meter high statue of an equestrian Alexander the Great. Political developments since 2014 are described later in this chapter. 
Economic Transformation
The process of privatization of the economy got underway in 1989, when Macedonia was still part of the SFRY. In 1990, the last Yugoslav federal government adopted a Law on Social Capital, which provided for the transfer of socially owned enterprises into private hands through the sale of shares to enterprise employees at large discounts and favorable payment schemes. After some modification of the original estimates, 1,216 enterprises were scheduled for privatization. Of this number, 113 were classified as large enterprises, 273 as medium-sized, and the rest as small. Between 1990 and 1991, roughly 240 mainly large and medium-sized enterprises were converted into joint-stock companies along the aforementioned lines. 27 Excluded from privatization were "mostly enterprises in infrastructure, social activities, public services, forestry, and other natural resources," as well as cultural and historical monuments. 28 However, the process of privatization was delayed when, on 19 August 1991, the Macedonian government declared that it would no longer follow the guidelines of the federal law (even though the country had not yet declared its independence). It was to take almost two years to pass a new law on privatization (in June 1993). This delay had very negative effects on the economy because, finding themselves in legal limbo, enterprise managers postponed all discussion of organizational, technological, and other restructuring and -worse yet -in anticipation that they might be in a position to acquire ownership rights in these enterprises, avoided any investments which would have increased the value of their respective enterprises and, thus, of the cost of Table 1 .2).
In the second half of 2014, the authorities offered some respite to the indigent, by successfully persuading some companies to cancel the debts of their poorest customers. This involved overdue bills for heating, water, electricity, and television services as well as overdue bank loans, and benefited roughly 40,000 families. to bring about this result, the government extended tax breaks to companies which agreed to the scheme. 38 Unemployment is lowest among Macedonians, highest among members of the small Turkish minority; the unemployment rate among the country's Albanians is also higher than that among Macedonians. 39 One factor which should be mentioned in this connection is that the level of educational attainment "is highest in ethnic elections in 2013. 56 The ruling party also misused the police and administrative apparatus to maintain its hold on power. 57 The Media
As of 2012, Macedonia was home to twelve newspapers, eight weekly magazines, seventy-six television stations, and more than 160 radio stations, competing as well with numerous internet media. 58 Given the small size of the Macedonian market (see 
End Box 11.3
This is, however, not the only problem which has impacted the media. Subtle pressures, short of manipulation through advertising proceeds, have also proven effective, inducing journalists to practice a form of self-censorship in which caution figures prominently. As a result, respect for basic professional standards has been weak in most media. 60 Those media that buck the tide and dare to offer reportage critical of the government, such as A1 television station, have been punished. Indeed, in 2010, Velija Ramkovski, the owner of A1 and its affiliated newspapers -Shpic, Vreme, and Koha e re -which had been critical of the IMRO-led government, was arrested and charged with money laundering, criminal conspiracy, and tax evasion. In 2011, A1
television was stripped of its broadcasting license and, the following year, Ramkovski and nineteen of his associates were convicted of the charges brought against them.
Ramkovski received a thirteen-year prison sentence, while his associates were sentenced to serve prison terms ranging from two to seven years. 61 Whatever the truth of the charges, Biljana Petkovska, director of the independent Macedonia Media Institute, suggested that "the actions undertaken towards these media, for which the 
Homophobia and Gender Inequality
Ironically, the single notable issue on which the heads of the Orthodox and Islamic faiths -nominally champions of love, charity, and brotherhood -could agree has been on a investigate the allegations of electoral fraud, government involvement in corruption, and illegal wiretapping. After a delay, the parliament approved a reshuffle of the cabinet, in which the Social Democrats would be allowed to appoint three deputy ministers. 107 Then, in January 2016, Gruevski announced that he would step down as prime minister and call early elections for April. But even as this went forward, the Office of the Special Prosecution, tasked with investigating wrong-doing on the part of the ruling party, complained that it was facing "serious financial and administrative obstacles to its work," with its funding delayed for more than twenty days. In this and other ways, the authorities were said to be sabotaging the work of the special prosecutor. 108 Even as Macedonians went through this deep political crisis, hundreds of thousands of Syrian, Afghan, Mali, Kosovar, and other refugees and migrants walked across their country over a period of months. Already in August 2015, Macedonian authorities declared a state of emergency because of the seemingly endless stream of refugees and migrants, most of them hoping to reach Germany. 109 In November, then tried to limit the flow to refugees from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and finally, on 27 January 2016, sealed its southern border, leaving 2,600 persons stranded on the Greek side of the border, 111 only to reopen the border the next day. 112 Meanwhile, with the opposition demanding more time to prepare and under pressure from the European Union and the United States, the government postponed the parliamentary elections which had been scheduled for 24 April until 5 June. But, amid allegations that the electoral roll included the names of dead persons as well as completely fictional persons, the leading opposition parties announced that they would not offer candidates for the 5 June elections. 113 After a delay, the parliament announced, on 18 May 2016, that the elections would be postponed once more -to the end of August. 114 Shortly thereafter, responding to public pressure, President Ivanov retracted his pardons of fifty-six persons; among those he had pardoned were Nikola Gruevski, who had stepped down as prime minister earlier in the year, and former transport minister Mile Janakieski. 115 and the Socialist Democrats claimed victory, with the latter, backed by the Albanian party, Besa, also alleging voting irregularities at 16 polling stations. 118 With this, IMRO was awarded 51 seats in the 120-seat parliament, while the Social Democrats were awarded 49 seats. Realizing that they were in the position to be king-makers and thus to dictate terms, three of the four political parties representing Macedonia's Albanian community met to coordinate strategy, drawing up a resolution specifying their demands as the price for participation in any coalition. These demands included: an amendment to the constitution to define both Macedonian and Albanian as official languages throughout the republic; "the adoption of a resolution in parliament condemning the genocide against Albanians in Macedonia during the period"; establishment of a new ministry to promote social equality among all of the country's citizens; and a serious program to promote economic development in Albanian-inhabited regions of the country. 119 On 9 January 2017, President Ivanov invited former prime minister Gruevski,, as head of IMRO, to form a new government. With 51 IMRO deputies elected to the parliament, Gruevski needed to make a coalition involving at least ten more deputies; this made his former coalition partner, the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), which had won ten seats, the ideal partner. Of the other Albanian parties, the Besa 118 government. 123 Zaev appealed to President Ivanov to grant him a mandate, and expressed confidence that he could secure a working majority in the parliament. 124 Opposing that outcome, Aleksandar Klimovski, a professor of constitutional law in Skopje, urged Ivanov to desist from such a move -which would mean calling for fresh elections. 125 
Conclusion
Throughout post-communist Central and Southeastern Europe one finds the following tendencies, in varying degrees ranging from slight to severe: the emergence of two dominant parties (or even just one) within the framework of a multi-party system; corrupt privatization, in which a nouveau riche class emerges, alongside growing numbers of poor and unemployed; an increase in both organized and petty crime; 126 the growth of political influence in the media; and persistent problems of corruption and intolerance, dwarfing anything found in communist times. In all of these respects, Macedonia is no exception, although its performance in some of these areas clearly places the country among the poorer performers both within the Central and Southeast
European region as a whole and among the Yugoslav successor states more specifically.
But in the case of Macedonia, the combination of the loss of the Yugoslav market together with its federal subsidies, the economic impact of the War of Yugoslav The symbiosis between the political and business elites -a feature also of other countries both in the post-communist region and elsewhere -is also characteristic of Macedonia's post-Yugoslav reality. At this stage, it is not possible, thus, to claim that Macedonia is building democracy. Where the Copenhagen Criteria demanded that Macedonia, as a candidate for EU membership, achieve "stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities," we find instead elections marred by the manipulation of voters and voting "irregularities," high levels of corruption, disregard for the sensitivities of Muslims and other non-Christians, and absolute contempt on the part of IMRO as well as of the
